path: root/man/2/spki

.TH SPKI 2
.SH NAME
SPKI: Cert, Hash, Key, Name, Seqel, Signature, Subject, Toplev, Valid \- simple public key infrastructure
.SH SYNOPSIS
.EX
include "bufio.m";
include "sexprs.m";
include "keyring.m";
include "spki.m";
spki := load SPKI SPKI->PATH;

Hash: adt {
    alg:    string;
    hash:   array of byte;

    sexp:   fn(h: self ref Hash): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
    text:   fn(h: self ref Hash): string;
    eq:     fn(h1: self ref Hash, h2: ref Hash): int;
};

Key: adt {
    pk:     ref Keyring->PK;    # either pk/sk or hash might be nil
    sk:     ref Keyring->SK;
    halg:   string;
    hash:   ref Hash;

    hashed: fn(k: self ref Key, alg: string): array of byte;
    sigalg: fn(k: self ref Key): string;
    text:   fn(k: self ref Key): string;
    sexp:   fn(k: self ref Key): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
    eq:     fn(k1: self ref Key, k2: ref Key): int;
};

Name: adt {
    principal:  ref Key;
    names:  list of string;

    isprincipal: fn(n: self ref Name): int;
    local:    fn(n: self ref Name): ref Name;
    islocal:  fn(n: self ref Name): int;
    isprefix: fn(n1: self ref Name, n2: ref Name): int;
    text:     fn(n: self ref Name): string;
    sexp:     fn(n: self ref Name): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
    eq:       fn(n1: self ref Name, n2: ref Name): int;
};

Cert: adt {
    e:        ref Sexprs->Sexp;   # S-expression, if originally parsed
    issuer:   ref Name;
    subject:  ref Subject;
    valid:    ref Valid;
    pick {
    A or KH or O => # auth, keyholder or object
        delegate:   int;
        tag:        ref Sexprs->Sexp;
    N =>    # name
    }

    text:     fn(c: self ref Cert): string;
    sexp:     fn(c: self ref Cert): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
};

Subject: adt {
    pick{
    P =>
        key:    ref Key;
    N =>
        name:   ref Name;
    O =>
        hash:   ref Hash;
    KH =>
        holder: ref Name;
    T =>
        k, n:   int;
        subs:   cyclic list of ref Subject;
    }

    eq:     fn(s1: self ref Subject, s2: ref Subject): int;
    principal:  fn(s: self ref Subject): ref Key;
    text:   fn(s: self ref Subject): string;
    sexp:   fn(s: self ref Subject): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
};

Signature: adt {
    hash:   ref Hash;
    key:    ref Key;    # find by hash if necessary
    sa:     string;
    sig:    list of (string, array of byte);

    sexp:   fn(s: self ref Signature): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
    text:   fn(s: self ref Signature): string;
};

Seqel: adt {
    pick{
    C =>
        c: ref Cert;
    K =>
        k: ref Key;
    O =>
        op: string;
        args: list of ref Sexprs->Sexp;
    S =>
        sig: ref Signature;
    E =>
        exp:    ref Sexprs->Sexp;
    }

    text:   fn(se: self ref Seqel): string;
};

Valid: adt {
    notbefore:  int;
    notafter:   int;

    intersect:  fn(a: self Valid, b: Valid): (int, Valid);
    text:   fn(a: self Valid): string;
    sexp:   fn(a: self Valid): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
};

Toplev: adt {
    pick {
    C =>
        v:  ref Cert;
    Sig =>
        v:  ref Signature;
    K =>
        v:  ref Key;
    Seq =>
        v:  list of ref Seqel;
    }
};

init:   fn();
date2epoch: fn(s: string): int; # YYYY-MM-DD_HH:MM:SS
epoch2date: fn(t: int): string;
time2secs:  fn(s: string): int; # HH:MM:SS
secs2time:  fn(t: int): string;

# parse structures
parse:      fn(s: ref Sexprs->Sexp): (ref Toplev, string);
parseseq:   fn(s: ref Sexprs->Sexp): list of ref Seqel;
parsecert:  fn(s: ref Sexprs->Sexp): ref Cert;
parsesig:   fn(s: ref Sexprs->Sexp): ref Signature;
parsename:  fn(s: ref Sexprs->Sexp): ref Name;
parsekey:   fn(s: ref Sexprs->Sexp): ref Key;
parsehash:  fn(s: ref Sexprs->Sexp): ref Hash;
parsecompound:  fn(s: ref Sexprs->Sexp): ref Name;

# tags
maketag:    fn(e: ref Sexprs->Sexp): ref Sexprs->Sexp;
tagintersect:  fn(t1: ref Sexprs->Sexp, t2: ref Sexprs->Sexp):
                 ref Sexprs->Sexp;
tagimplies: fn(t1: ref Sexprs->Sexp, t2: ref Sexprs->Sexp): int;

# hash canonical s-expression
hashbytes:  fn(a: array of byte, alg: string): array of byte;
hashexp:    fn(e: ref Sexprs->Sexp, alg: string): array of byte;
.EE
.SH DESCRIPTION
.B SPKI
provides data types and operations to help build implementations of the Simple Public Key Infrastructure
(SPKI).
It provides types for hash values, public and private keys, local and extended names,
principals and compound principles, certificates, validity periods, signatures, and proof sequences.
It also provides operations on authorisation tags.
Externally, SPKI represents all such things as particular forms of S-expression, internally represented using
.B Sexprs->Sexp
from
.IR sexprs (2).
.PP
.B Init
must be called before invoking any other operation of the module.
.PP
Most types defined here provide several common operations:
.TP
.IB t1 .eq( t2 )
Return true iff values
.I t1
and
.I t2
are equal.
.TP
.IB t .sexp()
Return an S-expression
.I s
representing the value of
.IR t .
Subsequently, the
.B Sexp
operation
.IR s .pack()
will yield an array of bytes containing the value
.I t
in SPKI's canonical S-expression form.
.TP
.IB t .text()
Return a textual representation of the value
.IR t ;
it is often just the textual representation of the corresponding S-expression.
.PP
.B Hash
is the internal representation of hash values,
containing an
algorithm name
.B alg
and the 
.B hash
itself as an array of bytes.
A
.B Hash
value can be created from an S-expression representing a SPKI
.B <hash>
element
by
.BR parsehash .
It returns nil if the S-expression was ill-formed.
.PP
.B Key
represents public and private keys,
with an optional associated hash algorithm when signing, and
an optional hash of the key itself.
SPKI identifies principals and public keys, thus each instance of a principal
in the other data structures is represented by a
.B Key
giving the corresponding public key, or its hash, or both.
Currently the public and private (secret) key values have types defined by
.IR keyring-intro (2).
A
.B Key
value can be created from an S-expression representing a SPKI
.B <public-key>
element by
.BR parsekey .
It returns nil if the S-expression was ill-formed.
.PP
.B Name
represents both local and extended names, and simple principals consisting of just a key.
The field
.B principal
gives the key that defines the name space in which the list of names is interpreted.
For simple principles, the list of
.B names
is nil.
A local name has exactly one name in the list.
Two parsing functions convert to
.B Name
from S-expressions.
.B Parsename
parses a SPKI
.B <name>
element:
.BI (name
[
.I principal
]
.I name
\&...
.BR ),
where
.I principal is either a
.B <public-key>
or a
.B <hash>
element.
.B Parsecompound
accepts either a
.B <name>
element as above, or a
.B <public-key>
or its
.BR <hash> .
Both functions return nil if the S-expression is ill-formed.
.PP
.B Subject
represents the subjects of SPKI name and authorisation certificates.
It has several variants in a
.B pick
adt, with suitable fields for each variant:
.TP
.B Subject.P
A simple principal: a
.BR key .
.TP
.B Subject.N
A group of principals or a delayed binding to a principal: a
.BR name .
.TP
.B Subject.O
The
.B hash
of an object.
.TP
.B Subject.KH
A keyholder certificate, that says something about a key's
.B holder
(represented by a
.BR Name ).
.TP
.B Subject.T
A
.I threshold
subject, used only in authorisation certificates.
The
.I n
subsidiary subjects are listed in
.BR subs ;
of those, at least
.I k
must sign a request for it to be authorised.
.TP
.B Subject
provides the common operations
.BR eq ,
.B sexp
and
.BR text ,
and a further operation:
.TP
.IB s .principal()
If
.I s
is a simple principal or a name, return the
.B Key
defining the principal, if known; return nil otherwise.
.PP
Subjects appear only as a subsidiary item in certificates and do not have a parsing function.
.PP
.B Cert
represents SPKI certificates.
There are four variants, represented by a pick adt:
.B Cert.A
(authorisation);
.B Cert.KH
(keyholder);
.B Cert.O
(object); and
.B Cert.N
(name).
The following fields and operations are common to all variants:
.TP
.B e
original S-expression (if created by
.BR parsecert )
to allow hashes and signatures to be computed on the SPKI canonical form of the certificate
.TP
.B issuer
The simple principal (represented as a name) that issued an authorisation, keyholder or object certificate,
or the
.B <issuer-name>
of a name certificate (allowing both local and extended names not just simple principals).
.TP
.B subject
The
.B Subject
of the certificate.
Name certificates may not have threshold subjects.
.TP
.B valid
Optional restriction on the certificate's validity
(see
.B Valid
for details).
.PP
Name certificates have only the fields above; the others have several more fields:
.TP
.B
delegate
True iff the certificate carries delegation rights (ie,
.B (propagate)
in the S-expression representation).
.TP
.B tag
An S-expression that expresses the authority granted by the certificate.
The expression
.B "(tag (*))"
means `all permissions'.
.PP
A
.B Cert
value
can be created from an S-expression representing a SPKI
.B <cert>
element by
.BR parsecert .
It returns nil if the expression was ill-formed.
.PP
SPKI
.B tag
expressions, represented internally by
.B Sexprs->Sexpr
trees, form a partial order,
including the pattern operations
.BR (*) ,
.BR "(* set " ...
.BR ),
.BR "(* prefix " ...
.BR ),
.BR "(* range " ...
.BR ),
and as an extension,
.BR "(* suffix " ...
.BR ).
Given two tag expressions
.I t1
and
.IR t2 ,
.I tagintersect
returns a tag expression representing
.I t1
∩
.IR t2 ;
.B tagimplies
returns true iff tag
.I t1
implies tag
.IR t2 :
(\fIt1\fP∩\fIt2\fP)=\fIt2\fP.
Both functions work correctly when
.I t1
and
.I t2
contain any legal combination of pattern operations.
.PP
SPKI structures are converted to a canonical form of S-expression to be hashed or signed
(with or without hashing).
.B Hashbytes
returns an array of bytes containing the result of hashing array
.I a
using hash algorithm
.I alg
(either
.B sha1
or
.BR md5 ).
.B Hashexp
returns an array of bytes containing the hash of the canonical form of expression
.I e
using hash algorithm
.IR alg .
.SH SOURCE
.B /appl/lib/spki.b
.SH SEE ALSO
.IR bufio (2),
.IR sexprs (2),
.IR spki-verifier (2)